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Abstract 
 
Forensic analysis of logs is one responsibility of an 
enterprise cyber defense team; inherently, this is a big 
data task with thousands of events possibly logged in 
minutes of activity. Logged events range from 
authorized users typing incorrect passwords to 
malignant threats. Log analysis is necessary to 
understand current threats, be proactive against 
emerging threats, and develop new firewall rules. This 
paper describes embedded analytics for log analysis, 
which incorporates five mechanisms: numerical, 
similarity, graph-based, graphical analysis, and 
interactive feedback. Topological Data Analysis (TDA) 
is introduced for log analysis with TDA providing novel 
graph-based similarity understanding of threats which 
additionally enables a feedback mechanism to further 
analyze log files. Using real-world firewall log data 
from an enterprise-level organization, our end-to-end 
evaluation shows the effective detection and 
interpretation of log anomalies via the proposed 
process, many of which would have otherwise been 
missed by traditional means.  
 
 
1. Introduction  
 
e-Government cyber systems are enterprise level 
systems which encompass a variety of devices and 
standards due to the myriad of e-Government services 
offered.  Additionally, these system are expected to be 
both secure and reliable in operations, accounting for 
and responding to a variety of cyber events [1] [2]. 
Enterprise cyber systems are all encompassing, which 
monitor and control access for any device that may use 
the network, from computers to Internet-of-Things 
(IoT) devices. Additionally, due to their scale and the 
sensitivity of the data and operations they support, 
enterprise cyber security involves many layers and 
efforts, such as encompasses multiple, very large local 
networks, which have their own devices, standards, and 
administration.  Enterprise cyber security often includes 
forensics analysis and security or data fusion centers to 
detect emerging threats [3] [4]. 
Firewalls and intrusion detection and prevention 
systems (IDPS) are one line of defense in securing 
networks by identifying and stopping suspicious 
network traffic. These systems operate by evaluating 
traffic against rules to: 1) evaluate event type (e.g., 
invalid user password), 2) consider predicates on event 
attributes, (such as “user failed 3 times”), and 3) trigger 
actions if both the incoming traffic matches a particular 
type and the predicates are satisfied [5].  Rules can refer 
to specific IP addresses to block or be sophisticated and 
evaluate multiple events over a time period [6].  When 
rules are triggered by a suspicious event, firewalls and 
IDPS devices save the event as an entry in a log file with 
details of what preprogrammed rules were violated and 
how the event was handled [7]. While containing a lot 
of useful information, log files do not contain the packet 
data itself that led to a particular event. Thus, analysis is 
on contextual data while analysis of the transmitted data 
itself, as in [8], is not generally possible.  
Logs from enterprise-level organizations can include 
thousands of events per second and millions per day [9]. 
This is expected to grow with increasing use of IoT 
endpoints [9]. Log files are one digital forensics data 
source to understand threats and discover new and 
emerging threats; however, log files analysis is often 
neglected in cyber security [9]. Since enterprise level 
cyber systems must provide accountability and look for 
emerging threats, cyber forensics of firewall and IDPS 
logs is a useful component of any enterprise-level cyber 
security operations [10]. However, the unstructured-
ness of cyber logs in enterprises results in significant 
manual analysis for cyber forensics [3] [10].    
The goal of this application is to improve general 
firewall digital forensics at the enterprise level through 
advanced analytical methods. Current approaches limit 
discovery by providing only an instance of results based 
on a given query. To remedy this, the authors present the 
application of topological data analysis (TDA) to log 
files, through which a feedback approach can be used 
for further analysis with descriptive/predictive statistics, 
and visualizations. TDA is an advanced numerical,  
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graph-based, and visual analytics approach that 
simultaneously considers similarity and shape of the 
data [11]. 
 While TDA has been proposed for cyber network 
analysis [12] [13] [14], it has yet to be applied for 
firewall logs. The closest application of TDA to log 
analysis is that of Chow [15], who applied TDA to 
Windows event logs from the BRAWL (Blue versus 
Red Agent War-game Evaluation) project. However, the 
work in [15] considered synthetic cyber data, a 
constrained and experimental environment, and could 
not find direct value in applying TDA to cyber data. 
Additionally, Coudriau et al. [14] applied TDA to 
network address data, but the data was not high in 
variety as typically found in logs. This paper thus 
illustrates the first application of TDA to real-world 
collected firewall logs from a large enterprise system, as 
well as the incorporation of TDA into a big data 
analytics platform for batch analysis of cyber logs. 
Beyond these contributions, the results also address the 
limitations of using TDA mentioned in [15].  
Analytics by themselves can be brittle; of interest in 
this paper is proposing and employing a combined 
experiential and analytical approach to log forensics 
through the data-driven, user-friendly embedded 
analytics platform. Herein, statistical and visual 
methods are combined into an embedded application. 
For this, the authors leverage their past work [3] in cyber 
analytics and employ a tabulated feature vector (TFV) 
approach to process log files and identify anomalies. In 
the TFV approach, log files are divided into temporal 
blocks and analysts are cued to blocks of interest. TDA 
extends this by looking at similarity across blocks, in 
addition to a further feedback loop process.   The key 
contributions from this paper are: 
• The first application of TDA to log analysis 
• Development of a human-machine approach that is 
simultaneously temporal, similarity, and 
statistically-based that incorporates feedback 
• Combination of statistical and visual methods for 
outlier/anomaly detection and interpretation  
• An evaluation of the developed approach on real 
enterprise log files on data consistent with [3]. 
 
2. Background  
 
Big data, such as network traffic, can be processed 
as batches or streams.  Batches are collected and then 
processed whereas streams are analyzed in real-time or 
near real-time [16]. Firewalls and IDPS systems 
consider streaming data wherein rules are applied to 
network traffic [6]. In contrast, digital forensics 
considers aggregated data in a batch process to find 
threats and develop new firewall/IDPS rules [17]. 
A general enterprise level data collection approach 
is conceptualized in Figure 1. At enterprise systems, raw 
logs are normalized into a structured file at a given 
facility, then forwarded to a Regional Center (RC) 
which both collects data and defends against cyber 
threats [18]. At the RCs, a regional Security Information 
and Event Management (SIEM) device aggregates, 
correlates, monitors and generates alerts from the 
received data. Data is then sent and aggregated from 
multiple regional SIEMs and sent to a global SIEM.  The 
global SIEM then connects to cyber analysis.    
In Figure 1, the big data platform can be considered 
as a centralized database for managing and analyzing 
big data [3].  Here, both structured and unstructured data 
is collected with high volume, variety, and velocity, the 
3 V’s [19], from which data can be queried and 
analyzed. Of interest is looking for understanding and 
interpretation of events that would have triggered a log 
entry; such understanding can be gained by developing 
embedded analytics methods that analysts can run to 
analyze log files and provide interpretations.  
 
2.1. Cyber Forensics Analytics  
  
 
Figure 1. Generic representation of an enterprise-level data collection hierarchy, from [3].   
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Fundamental to statistical data analysis, colloquially 
known as analytics, is the use of algorithms to find 
patterns [20]. Analytics methods range from supervised, 
with known classes/groups in the data (e.g. malignant 
and benign), to unsupervised, where classes/groups are 
unknown and need to be discovered (e.g. discovery of 
new groupings). Supervised analytics in cyber could 
include determining how similar observations are to 
known threats based on classifier algorithms.  
Unsupervised analytics, e.g. clustering, are especially 
relevant in cyber since the dynamic nature of cyber 
events means new threats are constantly emerging.   
Problematically, normal behavior for cyber 
networks constantly changes and conservative 
approaches are often pursued which yield secure 
systems with high false positive detection rates [21]. 
Such systems could hamper authorized use of networks, 
furthering the importance of identifying actual threats.  
In analyzing log files, one is essentially interested in 1) 
detecting the anomalies within the anomalies, and 2) 
finding emerging threats via forensic analysis.  
Two general approaches exist for cyber log forensics 
analytics: experiential/qualitative and analytical/ 
quantitative. Experiential cyber log forensics uses cyber 
analysts who rely on manual sorting and experientially 
gained knowledge to find possible threats for further 
investigation [3]. Such approaches are heavily effective 
and make use of the innate ability of humans to process 
large amounts of complex data [20]; however, big data 
challenges make it impossible to analyze all data 
effectively and novice analysts might miss events that 
veteran analysts would not [22].  Additional issues 
include the asymmetrical nature of cyber-attacks where 
attackers can focus on one approach while defenders 
must protect all systems from many different types of 
attacks, vulnerabilities, and threats [23]. 
To solve this problem, various analytical methods 
have been proposed to analyze logs [24]. Log analytics 
methods include both high level approaches, such as 
anomaly detection [25] [26], text analytics [27], 
dynamic rule creation [28], and event correlation [24], 
to the application of specific algorithms such as support 
vector machines [29], random forests [30], principal 
component analysis (PCA) and factor analysis (FA) [3]. 
However, analytics by themselves can be brittle. Of 
interest in this paper is proposing and employing a 
combined experiential and analytical approach to log 
forensics through a data driven embedded application.   
 
2.2. Big Cyber Log Data 
  
Due to the large size of enterprise networks and 
quantity of users, the data is of significant volume and 
emerging at high velocity; i.e. a big data problem. With 
a wide variety of devices at use in enterprise networks, 
each observation to the log can be highly variable from 
the others with the some logged fields being sparse due 
to differing approaches used at Regional SIEMs.  
Traditionally, analysts employed experiential 
approaches to digital forensics where large log files are 
manually sorted to find anomalies to further investigate. 
However, inspecting numerous potential incidents on a 
daily basis is not scalable. The work in [3] extended the 
manual process to develop an embedded analytics tool 
that examines an entire log file and provides tools to find 
novelty, anomalies, and contextual meaning in a log. 
Notably, the authors in [31] recently proposed a similar 
process to that of [3].  Herein, we extend upon [3] with 
more advanced analytics as well as a feedback approach.  
Due to sparsity, this research focuses on a reduced 
set of collected log fields, listed in Table 3. These fields 
were selected based on i) commonality between data 
fields logged by Regional SIEMS and ii) demonstrating 
statistical approaches to log file analysis without 
incorporating text mining techniques. Redundant fields 
from Regional SIEMs, e.g. Device_Vendor and 
Device_Product, were also grouped avoid confusion. 
 
Table 3. Dataset Variables 
Field Name Description 
Device Vendor Company who made the device 
Device Product Name of the security device 
Source Address IP address of the source 
Destination Address IP address of the destination 
Transport Protocol Transport protocol used 
Bytes In Number of bytes transferred in 
Bytes Out Number of bytes transferred out 
Category Outcome Action taken by the device 
Country_Name Country of the source IP address 
 
2.3. Tabulated Feature Vectors (TFVs) 
  
Tabulated feature vector (TFV) extraction gets 
around difficulties handling mixed and sparse data and 
facilitates the use of statistical methods for log data. The 
method proposed by Winding et al. [32], and further 
applied in [3] takes log files and aggregates 
observations. The resultant feature vector is a count of 
occurrences of unique values and columns [32].  
Figure 2 presents a conceptualization of the TFV 
process. In Figure 2a a conceptual raw log file is shown 
which include both categorical/text (Field A) and 
numerical (Field B) data columns. The process to create 
a TFV involves i) condensing text fields into columns of 
unique counts, and ii) summations of the original 
numerical values, which results in the TFV seen in 
Figure 2b.  Naturally, this method can be extended to 
different fields, categories, etc., with the result being a 
TFV of length dictated by the complexity of the log file.  
The process in Figure 2 would result in one 
observation, or row, if one applied it to an entire log file.  
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Thus, the TFVs are most useful if they divide the log 
files into blocks and then compute feature vectors for 
each block.  Notably, variables such as the number of 
observations per block become important and one would 
want to employ a trial and error approach to finding the 
right number of samples per block. Whole log files can 
be divided into blocks by specifying an amount of time 
each block should represent or the number of 
observations each block represents.  Intuitively, this can 
be accomplished using embedded analytics themselves. 
   
Field A Field B
X 1
Y 0
Z 3
X 2
Y 2
Y 1
Z 2
Z 0
Y 4
X Y Z B
Block 1 1 4 3 15
a) Example Raw Data b) Resultant Feature Vector
Process:
• Text fields have each unique 
entry enumerated
• Numeric fields are summed
• Feature vector has columns for 
each unique text field and each 
enumerated column
 
Figure 2. Generic feature vector creation process: (a) 
raw data; (b) resultant feature vector, from [3] 
 
As a representation of the approach, the example log 
file under analysis was divided into 136 sequential time 
blocks, which enabled each block to contain 289 
observations. TFVs were then computed for each block 
and the 9 data variables in Table 3 yielded 91 total 
features, including the top 10 source and destination IPs.   
 
3. Topological Data Analysis 
 
Topological Data Analysis (TDA), conceptualized 
in Figure 3, is a new unsupervised data mining approach 
wherein clustering, dimensionality reduction, and 
structure are considered together.  Through this 
combination of methodologies, TDA provides 
additional understanding of relationships within data, to 
include both shape and similarity [11].  
In TDA, one computes a topological model of the 
data using various distance measures and lenses.  
Practically, TDA extends upon this concept by binning 
observations based on similarity and then clustered 
based on shape and relationship. A graph-based 
relationship is then computed to show relative similarity 
between groupings of observations. 
As a process and data mining approach, TDA 
employs the concepts presented in the Mapper algorithm 
[11] and is a generalization of hierarchical clustering 
[33]. Considering the input data as a matrix, TDA 
performs 3 steps via the Mapper algorithm [11]:  
• data observations are placed into overlapping bins 
based on a metric 
• clustering to group each bin 
• realizing a network with vertices (clusters) and 
edges (intersections between clusters). 
 
Data Set
Points in 
common
=
Edges 
between 
nodes
 
Figure 3. General Concept of TDA as implemented 
in the Mapper algorithm, adapted from [34] 
 
As an algorithm, Mapper considers the inputs X as 
the data set, d as a metric on X, a scalar function  f:X→ 
ℝ, and an overlapping interval covering (ai, bi) by f(X) 
[11] [33]. The Mapper process considers a “preimage” 
f- -1 (ai, bi) and then uses the selected distance metric, d, 
to find pairwise distances between all observations [33], 
step 1 of Figure 3. Hierarchical clustering [35] is then 
performed to appropriately group points based on 
distance and other hyperparameter selections [33], step 
2 of Figure 3.  Next, step 3 of Figure 3, a graph-based 
topological model is constructed where vertices are 
clusters and clusters can be connected by an edge if 
these clusters share common observations. 
The Mapper algorithm has multiple 
hyperparameters, which are consistent with other 
mapper implementations [33], these include:  
• metrics, Table 1, the distance measure used for 
pairwise distance between all observations 
• lenses, Table 2, clustering approach employed 
• resolution, the number of intervals the data is 
portioned into 
• gain, the number of edges in a network 
• equalization, to ensure (or not) that all intervals 
contain the same number of points [33].   
Practically, increasing resolution creates a TDA model 
with more nodes and increasing the gain increases the 
number of edges in a TDA model [33]. For this TDA 
application, the authors used the Ayasdi Workbench.  
 
Table 1. General TDA Distance Metrics  
Euclidean Cosine Angle 
Variance or IQR 
Normalized Euclidean 
Correlation Norm Angle 
Absolute, Norm, or 
Distance Correlation 
Binary Jaccard Haversine 
Manhattan Jaccard Chebyshev 
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Table 2. General TDA Lenses  
Gaussian Density MDS 
Isomap Metric PCA 
L1 Centrality Neighborhood Graph 
L-infinity centrality Neighborhood 
Local Linear Embeddings SVD 
 
4. Combined Statistical and Graphical 
Approach for Cyber Forensics  
 
This work extends upon the work of [3] by 
incorporating TDA into the embedded analytics 
framework and also incorporating a feedback loop in the 
analytics process. For the embedded analytics, R was 
used, further illustrating the work of [36], which found 
that open source digital forensics can be effective. In 
operating embedded analytics apps, a cyber analyst can 
use the general process in Figure 4 whereby the 
preprocessing is automatically performed once a log file 
is selected, as discussed in [3].  From there, an analyst 
can use embedded applications to find blocks that have 
anomalous behavior. This section reviews and explains 
the process in Figure 4 and presents novel extensions of 
both applying TDA for log analysis, in addition to 
applying it in the analysis cycle of Figure 4 to enable 
graphical, similarity-based analytics of logs in a 
feedback approach in a larger analytics framework. 
 
Preprocessing
Big Data 
Platform
Block 
Creation
State 
Vector 
Multi-
collinearity 
Adjustment
Embedded Analytics
TDA
Histogram
IP 
Network 
Graph
Factor 
Analysis
Heatmap
Histogram 
Matrix
Graphical
Graphical
&
Similarity 
Across-Blocks
Feedback &
Queries
Factor 
Analysis
Scoreplot
 
Figure 4. Multivariate and Graphical Approach to 
Firewall Log Anomaly Detection, extended from [3], 
to include the feedback and TDA for log analysis 
   
4.1. Preprocessing 
  
Once log data is retrieved from the Big Data 
Platform, pre-processing, including TFV creation, is of 
interest prior to employing the analysis process.  As 
described in [3], preprocessing involves: 
1. Dividing the log file into time-regional blocks 
2. Creating tabulated state vectors 
3. Performing data quality checks and adjustments for 
multi-collinearity  
Figure 5, from [3], shows an example of a block created 
which consists of the categorical variables being labeled 
as factors and the numerical variables being labeled as 
numeric. In Figure 4, the counts are the number of levels 
associated with a categorical variable then denote the 
number of unique entries.  
 
Block 14 289 Obs. Of 8 variables
transportProtocol:  Factor w/ 4 levels “ICMP”, “No Protocol”, …:  2 2 2 2
bytesIn: int 0 0 0 0 0 0 …
bytesOut : int 0 0 0 0 0 0 …
categoryOutcome : Factor w/ 4 levels “/Attempt”, “/Failure”, … : 4 4 4
Country_Name : Factor w/ 31 levels “Country 1”, “Country 2”, … : 31
Device_Name : Factor w/ 19 levels “Device 1” , “Device 10”, … : 11  11
sourceAddress_mask : Factor w/ 3376 levels “Source IP 1”, … : 2  2 2
destinationAddress_mask : Factor w/ 4786 levels “Destination IP 1”,…  
Figure 5. Sample time block 
 
One example can be seen in the 6th line of Figure 5, 
Device_Name, which has 19 unique categories, or 
levels, in the example log file. This indicates that logged 
entries from 19 different devices were found in this log 
file.  These 19 devices will then become 19 different 
columns in the tabulated state vectors, per Section 2.3. 
Logged IP addresses are considered to only the top 10 
observed IP addresses (both source and destination) and 
the associated counts of these observed IP addresses are 
recorded. These vectors are then aggregated into a single 
matrix, the state vector matrix. 
Before analytics are applied, the columns are 
checked for multicollinearity which could result in 
unreliable mathematical results.  In this step, columns 
with multicollinearity issues, e.g. matrix singularity, 
rank deficiency, and strong correlation values, are 
identified and removed [3]. 
 
4.2. Embedded Analytics  
 
Once the data has been preprocessed, an analyst can 
consider the embedded analytics suite and look for 
anomalies, threats, and emerging behavior.  For this 
step, there are two general paths:  
1) the Histogram Matrix (HMAT) that served as the 
foundation of [3] 
2) Topological Data Analysis (TDA) and its feedback 
ability with HMAT, as proposed in this paper. 
With these methods, HMAT is used to enable graphical, 
within-blocks, and across-blocks analysis of blocks, 
whereas TDA is used to look across blocks for similarity 
and enable feedback and queries of blocks for HMAT 
analysis. By incorporating TDA, embedded analytics 
can be expanded to examine across the state matrix.   
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 4.2.1. Histogram Matrix (HMAT). HMATs, a general 
extension of heatmaps, are used consistent with [3] 
where each cell’s value is a colorized circle with the 
color representing one value and the size of the circle 
representing another value. HMAT for cyber log files 
visualize anomalies by coloring cells based on their 
squared Mahalanobis distance, a general outlier 
detection method, and provide an understanding of the 
relative magnitude of the Mahalanobis distances based 
on a scaling factor, the Breakdown Distance (BD) [3].  
 
 
Figure 6. Histogram Matrix (HMAT) 
 
HMAT for cyber log analysis uses the color to 
represent the raw value of how anomalous a specific 
column’s value is in a block, color determined from 
Mahalanobis distances, and a further understanding of 
the relative BD value, size of the circle. Mahalanobis 
distance, a multivariate anomaly/outlier detection 
method, compares each observation, x, via 
 𝑀𝐷 = √(𝑥 − ?̅?)𝐶−1(𝑥 − ?̅?) (1) 
with 𝑥 = (𝑥1, … , 𝑥𝑝), a vector of p observations, ?̅? =
(𝑥1̅̅̅, … , 𝑥𝑝̅̅ ̅), 𝑎 the mean vector of the data, and 𝐶
−1 
being the inverse data covariance matrix [35]. Based on 
their raw scores, MD values can be used to find 
anomalies by relative magnitudes. 
However, MD does not directly provide a rationale 
for what is or is not an anomaly; thus, we proposed the 
use of BD in [3], which is computed as,  
 
𝐵𝐷𝑖 = |
(𝑥𝑖 − 𝑥?̅?)
√𝐶𝑖𝑖
| 
(2) 
where 𝑥𝑖 is a given variable, 𝑥?̅? is the mean of the 
variable, and 𝐶𝑖𝑖 is the variance of xi, which are the 
diagonal values of C.  BD scales the distance of each 
variable from the mean by their variance which thus 
indicates the relative contribution of each variable to a 
given MD score [3]. 
When considering the example dataset with HMAT, 
one sees Figure 6. Here, block numbers (y-axis) and 
column names (x-axis) are abstractly represented to 
enable a big picture view to find potential anomalous 
behavior. From these results, a user would select 
specific blocks for further analysis. Briefly, one would 
look for darker shaded circles, indicating a column in a 
block contains anomalous behavior for this log file, and 
then look at the size of the circles whereby larger circles 
indicate that a given variable is increasing the MD for 
that particular block. As discussed in [3], in Figure 6, 
the clearest anomalies are blocks 14, 27, 44 and 63.    
 
4.2.2. Within-Blocks Analytics. Within-blocks 
analysis considers spillage of top attributes across 
neighboring time blocks to understand how particular 
columns are anomalous given the neighboring blocks.  
For this approach, the top five columns are examined via 
histograms to: 1) observe the data columns that cause 
the block to be anomalous and 2) examine any regional 
temporal relationship between the top five anomalous 
columns and the neighboring time blocks [3]. The 
example in Figure 6 shows Country 10 and Device 12 
as appearing as anomalous only in Block 14; and Device 
2 appearing only in Block 14 and adjacent blocks. Thus, 
these features might indicate a particular event in or 
around Block 14 associated with these attributes.  
 
 
Figure 6. Block 14 Within-Blocks Analysis with Top 
5 Anomalous Columns per Breakdown Distance 
 
4.2.3. Across-Blocks Analytics. Basic across blocks 
analytics involves considering statistics for the entire 
state vector matrix.  For this PCA or FA are used to 
aggregate data features and reduce dimensionality [3] 
[35]. PCA is a linear transformation approach that 
projects the original data by the eigenvectors of the data 
covariance matrix to explain variation in the data; FA 
extends upon PCA with a rotation, varimax used herein, 
of retained components, to better represent the data [35].  
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The dimensionality assessment process (number of 
components to retain) used herein was Horn’s curve for  
to select k unrotated (PCA) features and then Kaiser’s 
Index of Factorial Simplicity was used to assess the 
quality of the FA rotation [3]. When considering the 
example state vector matrix through this process, the 
dimensionality of columns is reduced from 91 variables 
to 6 retained components/factors.   
 
 
Figure 7. Heatmap of Loadings Matrix from 
Example Data with red = negative, blue = positive. 
 
The result of across-blocks analytics is both a 
heatmap of the loadings and x-vs-y factor plots. A 
loadings heatmap, Figure 7, present a correlation matrix 
of the original data and transformed factors to provide 
an understanding of variable contributions to factors. As 
an example analysis, factor 1 in Figure 7 shows that 
devices and protocols were highly correlated with IP 
addresses from Countries 16, 17, 18, and 29. From here, 
analysts can incorporate contextual information, e.g. 
possibly linking activity in this log file to known TOR 
exit nodes. Further interpretation of Figure 7 shows a 
possible connection between rules triggered in Device 4 
and Device 13 and IPs from Countries 7 and 10, which 
reinforces the interpretation of Figure 6 where Country 
10 and Device 13 are seen active around Block 14.  
Factor plots, Figure 8, consider the factor scores as 
plotted in a pairwise manner for the 6 retained factors of 
Figure 7.  While the most variation is explained in 
decreasing amount by each retained component/factor, 
with this data, possible anomalous blocks are not 
apparent until examining rotated scores 3 and 5 with  
Based on Figure 8, potential anomalous time blocks, are 
blocks 27, 63, 14 and 44. These can then be evaluated 
further with HMAT, histograms, or graphical methods. 
 
Figure 8. Factor plot using varimax rotated FA 
scores and identified outlier blocks 
 
 
Figure 9. IP Network Graph of Block 14 with 
detected port scan 
 
4.2.4. Graphical Analytics. Graphical analysis of the 
entire state matrix or a specific block are a further 
direction to interpret a log file. IP network graphs, e.g. 
Figure 9, visualize connections between source IP 
addresses and the destination IP(s) within a dataset 
allowing one to look for visual cues to understand 
possible interactions and trends. While Figure 9 which 
mostly shows singletons, i.e. single IP addresses, or 
simple pairs, two groups are of interest, an encircled in 
red.  Both groups show clusters of source IP addresses 
linking to multiple destination IP addresses.  A top level 
interpretation of these clusters is that a computer was 
performing a port scan, possibly attempting to 
fingerprint the network, and thus an analyst can revisit 
this time block to understand this event further. 
 
4.2.5. TDA for Graphical and Similarity Across-
Blocks Analytics. Missing in the process described 
above, and in [3], is an understanding of similarity 
across all blocks and feedback to repeatedly discover 
and query. For example, the HMAT might indicate 
which blocks have higher activity of Country 10, but not 
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what blocks are largely similar across this and all 
columns. Additionally, with this information of 
similarity, a user could select further blocks to refine 
and redo the analysis discussed in 4.2.1-4.2.4.  
Incorporating TDA can address both challenges. 
TDA is performed on the entire state matrix of TFVs 
and multiple topological models are constructed with 
different combinations of lenses, metrics, resolutions, 
and gains. One example topological model, which will 
be discussed further, is presented in Figure 10a. Due to 
the breadth of options for TDA, discussed in Section 3, 
exhaustive combinations of metrics and lenses was not 
considered.  For the model in Figure 10a, a cosine metric 
was used along with kurtosis and variance lenses. 
Cosine distances can be useful because they are 
translation variant but scale invariant, in contrast to 
Euclidean distances [37]. 
In Figure 10 we see four groupings of nodes with 
three of these groupings show connections, and thus 
similarities, of nodes; the fourth grouping is of 
singletons, which are not similar to other nodes based 
on this selection of metrics and lenses. Coloring is also 
possibly by the features used to generate the models, 
with the default coloring (10a) being a divergent color 
scheme (blue to red) based on block number (blue 
representing mostly low numbered blocks and red 
indicating a high concentration of higher numbered 
blocks).  In the middle grouping, we see a large 
concentration of such dark red nodes in the middle and 
then there is a gradient as one moves left or right across 
this grouping.   
Colored by Country 10 (Figure 10b), we see mostly 
blue nodes, indicating few if any events from Country 
10 except in the middle grouping which has high 
concentrations of Country 10 activity on both the far 
right and left ends. In part, Country 10 thus separates 
this group from the rest of the groups. Revisiting Block 
14, we find it in right most node of the middle grouping.    
Colored by No Protocol (10c), we see the frequency 
of No Protocol events.  A general separation is seen for 
all three groups and we can further investigates the FA 
loadings plot of Figure 7.  The upper grouping is largely 
orange, indicating an average amount of No Protocol 
events.  The lower grouping is mostly yellow, green, and 
blues; indicating few occurrence. However, the middle 
grouping presents a color gradient that moves from 
left to right in increasing No Protocol concentration.  
   
4.3. Feedback with TDA  
 
To further investigate what gathers together, we can 
click on a node and then find what blocks it contains.  
This functionality moves beyond capabilities available 
in Ayasdi Workbench and incorporates its functionality 
into the Big Data Platform.  Here, we can enable analyst 
driven feedback whereby analysts can take the 
knowledge from the topological models and then 
examine each node within this model with the HMAT 
tool.  From here, the process throughout Section 3 and 4 
can be repeated to down-select blocks and find more 
novelty and understanding of behaviors. 
An example is presented in Figure 11. Here, HMATs 
are presented for the three rightmost nodes of the middle 
grouping. These HMATs now enable one to find 
anomalies and trends within these subsets.  Considering 
the rightmost node in HMAT1 (bottommost HMAT in 
Figure 11), which contains the Block 14 discussed 
above, is found together with other potential blocks.  Of 
particular interest appears Block 48, which has high 
levels of activity from Country 27, as well as the 
adjacent Block 49, which also appears.  A set of adjacent 
blocks with strong anomalous scores also appears in the 
next node, HMAT2 in the upper right of Figure 11, 
which shares Blocks 48 and 49 with the rightmost node. 
When we move over to the 3rd node from the right, 
we see HMAT3 at the top left of Figure 11.  Here, only 
4 blocks are contained within this node.  Most of these 
blocks do not contain much anomalous activity, but 
Block 16 appears to be active across most columns.  
Since the other 3 blocks within this node are similar, we 
might first investigate Block 16 and also look for 
similar, but lower, activity in the Blocks 4, 37, and 127 
which appear similar. Interestingly, HMAT2 and 
HMAT3 both overlap on Block 16, but Block 16 did not 
appear notable in HMAT2. While Block 16 would have 
likely been ignored just looking at the HMAT in Figure  
 
a)  Coloration by block number, with a 
divergent color scheme (blue indicating 
lower numbered, and red indicating 
higher numbered, blocks) 
 
b) Coloration by Country 10 with blue 
colors representing low (or no) counts 
and red colors indicating high counts. 
 
c)  Coloration by No Protocol with blue 
colors representing low (or no) counts and 
red colors indicating high counts.  
Figure 10.  Custom topological model using Metric: Cosine, Lens 1: Approximate Kurtosis, Lens 2: 
Variance. Resolution: 30 (both lenses), gain: 2.50 (both lenses), with neither lens equalized.    
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6, the addition of TDA and feedback has enabled further 
discovery of potentially interesting patterns. 
 
5. Conclusions 
 
The authors presented a systematic experiential and 
data driven approach to cyber log analysis. For cyber log 
analytics, the authors employed a tabulated feature 
vector (TFV) approach which extracted numerical, and 
non-sparse, data from sparse log files. With the TFVs, 
the authors developed a human-machine approach that 
was simultaneously temporal, similarity, and 
statistically-based while also incorporating a feedback 
mechanism.  This paper also provided the first 
application of Topological Data Analysis (TDA) to log 
analysis.  In particular, it was seen that TDA enabled 
one to look across all blocks to find similarity of events 
for further interpretation. By enabling one to repeated 
query the dataset through the feedback mechanism, the 
authors showed how one can find anomalous behavior 
to examine which would have been missed by 
approaches in literature.  Finally, this research illustrates 
how to develop an embedded analytics approach for 
anomaly detection, which is reproducible and 
generalizable to other datasets, and other types of log 
files, which have different data features.  
Straightforward extensions include exploring the 
application of the presented method to other types of log 
files. Future work can also involve extending the TFV 
process to include sparse data fields, which are currently 
removed due to multicollinearity issues.  Further future 
work can consider further automation of the general 
process in Figure 4 to bring human analysts; which 
could be accomplished by automating the novelty 
detection of TDA data products. Additional research can 
involve TDA in general, including better understanding 
the TDA hyperparameter space, comparison with other 
clustering methods, and selecting appropriate analytics 
given TDA outputs on the shape of the data.  
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